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COMMODITY SUPPLY AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL PATENT
INFRINGEMENT IN LIFE
TECHNOLOGIES V. PROMEGA
G. EDWARD POWELL III*
INTRODUCTION
The Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to make copyright and patent law in order
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 is one of the
few provisions of that document explicitly endorsing a utilitarian
rationale for lawmaking.2 The courts have fallen on a spectrum between
two extreme approaches to interpreting statutes enacted under this
clause: (1) nearly entire deference to congressional judgments of what
promotes progress or (2) strict judicial review of IP statutes in light of
the constitutionally required goal.3 Deference to Congress’s judgment
in IP cases accords with the principle of separation of powers,4 but the
present levels of industry capture that plague Congress suggest that the
laws as written may hinder progress rather than promote it,5 in
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY—CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (3d ed. 2016).
3. Compare Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (using rational basis review to
uphold a copyright law) and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (similarly using rational
basis review to uphold a copyright law), with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,
819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (suggesting a progress-oriented approach to
interpreting copyright statutes) and Golan, 565 U.S. at 345 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] copyright
is . . . a bounty designed to encourage new production . . . [t]he statute before us, however, does
not encourage anyone to produce a single new work.”).
4. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (“The wisdom of Congress’ action . . . is not within our
province to second-guess.”).
5. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 64–65 (2008) (describing conditions likely to
result in intellectual property policies that hinder the market-based pattern of technological
progress).

POWELL FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

164

3/9/2017 1:59 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12

contravention of the Constitution’s limitation on Congress’s power to
make IP law.
Judicial fidelity to both the IP Clause and separation of powers is
thus sometimes difficult to maintain. An appropriate middle ground,
therefore, has been not to use a strict reading of the IP Clause’s stated
purpose as a stick to strike down IP laws, but to interpret IP statutes so
that they, in a court’s own reasoned judgment, promote progress.6 This
method of interpretation helps courts avoid intruding too far into the
legislative process as they effectuate the constitutional purpose of IP
law.
The Supreme Court took advantage of an opportunity to interpret
an ambiguous statute in a way that promotes progress in Life
Technologies v. Promega.7 In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the
Court properly upheld the freedom of manufacturers of unpatented,
staple articles of commerce to operate within a global supply chain
without fear of patent infringement liability. To that end, the Court
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) not to reach the supply of only one of
the components of a patented invention.8
This Commentary discusses this case, proceeding in five parts. Part
One summarizes the facts and procedural background of the case, Part
Two introduces the basic legal concept of patent infringement and the
history of § 271(f), Part Three states the holdings of both appellate
courts, and Part Four states the arguments made by each party before
the Supreme Court. Part Five explains the Supreme Court’s holding
and makes an economic policy argument for the Court’s decision as
opposed to the Federal Circuit’s holding.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Life Technologies manufactures genetic testing kits in the United
Kingdom for sale worldwide.9 Its kits contain at least five components:
primer mix, Taq polymerase, PCR reaction mix with nucleotides, buffer
solution, and control DNA.10 These kits are useful for making extra
copies of a targeted area of DNA, resulting in a detectable amount of
6. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (discussing the
importance of network effects in a determination of whether a computer command menu is
entitled to copyright protection).
7. Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538 (Feb. 22, 2017).
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 2; Brief for Petitioners at 6, Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538 (Sep. 1, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
10. Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2.
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DNA being available for analysis and use in forensic, clinical, or
research contexts.11 Each of the components must be present for the kit
to function.12 Taq polymerase, a DNA-copying enzyme, is a staple
article of commerce13 and can be purchased on Amazon.14 For some of
the kits, Life Technologies supplied only the Taq polymerase from the
U.S. and sourced the other components elsewhere.15
Promega Corporation, a licensee of the patent on the kit
themselves, had sublicensed the patent to Life Technologies under
restrictive terms, forbidding the sale of kits for clinical or research use.16
When Life Technologies sold kits in a manner that violated the license,
Promega sued in the Western District of Wisconsin for patent
infringement.17 Life Technologies admitted that their U.S. sales had
infringed the patent but denied that they had supplied, from the U.S., a
substantial portion of the components of the kits sold abroad, as they
had supplied only the Taq polymerase.18 The jury found that Life
Technologies had infringed the patent and calculated damages based
on the company’s total worldwide sales, implying that they believed the
supply of only the Taq polymerase for some of the extraterritorially
sold kits to be an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).19 The district
court entered judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) for Life
Technologies on multiple grounds, one of which was that liability under
§ 271(f) requires the supply of more than one component.20 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that substantial evidence
supported the original jury verdict, and entered judgment accordingly.21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether
the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity
component of a multi-component invention from the United States is

11. Id. at 2–3; Brief for Respondent at 5, Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538 (Oct. 24, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
12. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 7.
13. Staple articles of commerce are commodities capable of substantial noninfringing use.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (describing the
“staple article of commerce” doctrine in the copyright context).
14. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 7; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 41, Life Techs.
Corp., No. 14-1538 (argued Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
15. Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2–3; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 8.
16. Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2–3; Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 6.
17. Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 3; Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7.
18. Id. at 8; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 10.
19. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 9–10.
20. Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 4; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 10–11.
21. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 11.
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an infringing act under § 271(f)(1).22 A few weeks after oral argument,
Chief Justice Roberts became aware of a conflict of interest and
recused himself from the case.23 The case was thus decided by only
seven justices.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
American patent law grants the holder of a patent the exclusive
right to make, sell, and use the patented invention within the U.S.24
Because U.S. patent law largely does not apply extraterritorially,
anyone seeking to benefit from an invention patented in the U.S. could
avoid liability by confining their manufacturing, sales, and use to nonU.S. markets.25 A middle scenario, where a manufacturer makes
components of an invention in the U.S. but does not make the entire
assembled invention, led to the passage of § 271(f).26
Section 271(f) is an exception to the general rule basing
infringement liability only on conduct within the U.S.27 It was passed
after the Supreme Court decided Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.,28 holding that a patentee’s right to “make” an invention was not
infringed by making each of the components of the invention and
shipping them abroad for final, trivial assembly.29 Section 271(f)(1)
closes the loophole revealed by Deepsouth by prohibiting “suppl[ying]
. . . from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention . . . to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States . . . .”30 Such a supplier will be
liable only if elements analogous to active inducement of patent
infringement—knowledge of a valid patent and intent that the patent
be practiced—are present.31 Since patent law does not apply
extraterritorially, no act of actual infringement under § 271(a) is
required for inducement liability under § 271(f)(1).
22. Id. at 12.
23. Roberts recuses from patent case after discovering conflict, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 4,
2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/52f85668c4244c0d8363978876acbf85/roberts-recuses-patent-c
ase-after-discovering-conflict.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
25. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).
26. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 443–44 (2007).
27. Id. at 442.
28. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
29. Id. at 527–28.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
31. § 271(f)(1) requires that the supplier “actively induce” combination of the components,
which imports the active inducement standard from § 271(b). Brief for Respondent, supra note
11, at 34–35.
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Section 271(f)(1) effectively overruled Deepsouth; it also prohibits
conduct that is further from classic patent infringement than the facts
of Deepsouth were, as it provides for liability when less than “all” of the
components are supplied.32 The statute allows for infringement liability
based on the supply of “a substantial portion of the components,” not
just “all” of them, in order to close, rather than move, the loophole.33
Section 271(f)(2) goes even further: it prohibits the supply of even a
single component if the component (1) is knowingly specially made or
adapted for use in the patented invention, (2) is not a commodity with
substantial noninfringing uses, and (3) is intended to be combined with
other components to practice the patented invention.34 The legislative
history indicates, and the text suggests, that § 271(f)(1) is modeled on
the active inducement provision, § 271(b), and § 271(f)(2) on the
secondary liability provision, § 271(c).35
The Supreme Court construed § 271(f) narrowly in Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp.,36 reading it in light of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.37 Even though the statute expressly conditions
liability on extraterritorial conduct—active inducement requires that
the induced party actually practice the patent—the presumption
“remains instructive in determining the extent of the statutory
exception,” so reading expansive liability into the statute would violate
the presumption.38
III. HOLDING
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that one component could be a “substantial portion of the
components” as required for liability under § 271(f)(1).39 The court
based its decision on the ordinary meaning of “substantial portion,”
defining “substantial” to mean “important or essential,” and defining
“portion” as a “part of a whole.”40 On the facts of the case, evidence
supported the proposition that Taq polymerase was a “main” and
“major” component, without which the kits would be inoperable; this
32.
33.
34.
35.
271(f)).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

§ 271(f)(1).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2012).
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 29–30 (discussing the legislative history of §
550 U.S. 437 (2007).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455–56 (emphasis in original).
Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1353.
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was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Taq polymerase
was a “substantial portion,” and thus expose Life Technologies to
damages based on their worldwide sales.41
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.42 Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion for the Court construed the text of § 271(f)(1) to exclude
supply of only one component, as the district court did.43 The text,
structure, and history of the statute indicated that Congress intended
to require the supply of multiple components for liability to attach.44
IV. ARGUMENTS
1. Petitioner’s Arguments
Before the Supreme Court, Life Technologies argued for reversal
on three grounds: (1) the text and structure of the statute suggest that
a “substantial portion” approximates “all” and excludes a single
component; (2) the presumption against extraterritoriality suggests a
narrow reading of the statute; and (3) the statute was intended to close
a loophole in classic patent infringement, not impose liability on
commodity manufacturers based on the worldwide use of their
commodities in patented inventions.45
Life Technologies contended that one component is insufficient for
liability since “substantial” in the statute is quantitative, not
qualitative.46 Since “substantial portion” follows the quantitative term
“all,” it should be interpreted in line with the quantitative dictionary
meanings of “substantial,” and also, contextually, akin to “all.”47 The
phrase “substantial portion of the components” also suggests a
quantitative interpretation in a way that alternative drafting
possibilities, such as “substantial portion of the invention,” would not
have; “components” being a plural noun suggests that a single
important component would not be a “substantial portion of the
components.”48 The following contextual phrase, “where such

41. Id. at 1356.
42. Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538, slip op. syllabus at 2–3 (Feb. 22, 2017).
43. Id. at 4, 8.
44. Id. at 8, 10.
45. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 12–14.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 17–18.
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Life Techs.
Corp. No. 14-1538.
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components are uncombined,” also suggests that multiple components
are presumed to be involved in a “substantial portion.”49
Life Technologies additionally pointed to the text of § 271(f)(2),
which expressly provides for liability (under more stringent conditions)
when a single component is supplied, suggesting that § 271(f)(2) is the
exclusive avenue for liability based on a qualitatively important, single
component.50 To hold that § 271(f)(1) could encompass a single,
qualitatively assessed component would be to render § 271(f)(2)
surplusage.51 The Supreme Court, in dicta in Microsoft, suggested that
the two subsections provided for liability based on the supply of
different and non-overlapping numbers of components, reflecting the
most natural reading of the statute.52
Next, Life Technologies argued that the presumption against
extraterritoriality requires interpreting § 271(f) narrowly, as stated in
Microsoft.53 This presumption recognizes that U.S. law does not govern
the world and favors resolving ambiguities in statutes to minimize the
law’s impact on foreign conduct.54 Because § 271(f) conditions liability
on the combination of components “outside the United States,” it
invites the narrow construction that comes with statutes that address
extraterritorial conduct.55 Therefore, any doubt as to whether a single
component can be a “substantial portion of the components” should be
resolved in favor of Life Technologies.56
Finally, Life Technologies argued that the purpose of § 271(f) is to
cover conduct similar to conventional patent infringement, not to
dramatically expand liability to the manufacture of single commodity
components that are used in patented inventions abroad.57 To expand
liability thus would chill U.S. manufacturing and result in suppliers
moving their factories overseas to avoid U.S. patent liability.58 This
could not be what Congress intended when passing § 271(f).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 20–21.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 38.
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2. Respondent’s Arguments
Promega argued for affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s ruling,
rejecting Life Technologies’ proposed purely numerical interpretation
of § 271(f)(1), on three grounds: (1) ‘substantial’ can be read
qualitatively (and should, in this fact-specific inquiry) to support the
Federal Circuit’s ruling; (2) the presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply here, where no liability is imposed based on foreign
conduct; and (3) Life Technologies’ fears of unfettered liability grinding
international commerce to a halt ignore the statute’s specific intent
required for active inducement liability59
Promega emphasized that the Federal Circuit was merely finding
substantial evidence to support a jury verdict, and therefore any legal
conclusions regarding how much of a patented invention must be
supplied to trigger liability are minimally controlling for future cases,
as they simply illustrate facets of a comprehensive fact-based inquiry.60
Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s specific, quoted rationales for
reinstating the verdict after the district judge entered a contrary JMOL
would not necessarily be sufficient to support a finding of infringement
in another case.61 Even if a defendant supplied a “main” and “major”
component of a patented invention, without which the device “would
be inoperable,” these statements are not the test for liability.62 Rather,
a fact-based inquiry would need to find that the defendant’s
contribution amounted to a “substantial portion” for liability to
attach.63 Reading the statute to require this sort of inquiry is consistent
with the use of the broader term “substantial” as opposed to more
clearly quantitative terms, such as Life Technologies’ proposed
construction, “a large percentage closely approximating all.”64
Promega argued that a broad reading of “substantial” is also
consistent with the statute’s history and purpose, which was to expand
liability beyond both classic patent infringement and the facts of
Deepsouth, not to restrict it.65 The legislative history indicates that §
271(f)(1) was modeled on the active inducement provision, § 271(b),
while § 271(f)(2) parallels the contributory infringement provision, §

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 2–4.
Id. at 42–43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18, 40.
Id. at 27.
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271(c).66 The crucial difference between the two provisions—the reason
for finding liability under one provision and not the other—is thus the
relevant specific intent required, not the number of components
involved.67 Since there is overlap between classic active inducement
and contributory infringement liability, there is no good reason to read
§ 271(f)(2) as excluding the possibility of § 271(f)(1) liability for the
supply of a single component.68
The requirement of active inducement also limits the potential
commodity-supplier liability that Life Technologies suggested would
be the result of the Federal Circuit’s holding.69 Since intent is required
for active inducement, only a showing of knowledge of the patent, and
intent to supply components and induce the other to practice the patent
abroad, would lead to liability.70 Promega asserts that such liability is
rare, and that the Federal Circuit’s decision to recognize such liability
two years ago has not led to a flood of patent litigation targeting
commodity suppliers.71 Promega also criticizes Life Technologies’
proposed bright-line rule as inviting new loopholes involving multiple
suppliers, with each supplying a single component of a patented
invention for assembly abroad.72
Promega also argued that the active inducement requirement limits
the applicability of the presumption against extraterritoriality.73 Since
what is regulated is domestic conduct done with the specific intent to
induce foreign practice of a patent, and no liability is imposed on an
actor based on that actor’s foreign conduct, the presumption does not
operate to narrow the statute.74 Moreover, Life Technologies’ proposed
rule would not operate to shield manufacturers that make multiple,
trivially significant commodity components, at least two of which could
be used in a patented invention, from liability, whereas a qualitative
reading of “substantial” could avoid unwanted liability in this
scenario.75

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 44–45.
Id.
Id. at 40.
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V. ANALYSIS
Life Technologies was correct that imposing liability based on the
supply of only one component would likely increase costs on American
manufacturers who supply components for global markets, contrary to
Congress’s probable intent. Life Technologies’ textual arguments were
in better accord with the text and structure of the statute, and the
precedential background of the case favored Life Technologies as well.
At oral argument, the Justices seemed to favor Life Technologies’
construal of the statute; at times, multiple Justices misstated the
relevant statutory language as “all or substantially all,” Life
Technologies’ preferred interpretation, rather than the actual phrase
“all or a substantial portion.”76 So it is little surprise that Life
Technologies prevailed.
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court dispensed with the case
purely on non-policy statutory-interpretation grounds. The Court
accepted Petitioners’ argument that “substantial” is quantitative and
“components” is plural in the context of the statute.77 The Court cited
the structure of the statute as evidence that multiple components are
required for liability under § 271(f)(1).78 The Court also referenced the
historical context of the enactment of § 271(f), which indicates that it
was intended to close the Deepsouth loophole.79 The Court declined,
however, to adopt Life Technologies’ preferred interpretation of the
statute: its narrow holding, that § 271(f)(1) liability could not attach to
supply of only a single component,80 leaves open the possibility of
liability for supplying multiple components that do not amount to “a
large percentage closely approximating all” of the invention.81 In doing
so, the Supreme Court continued its recent pattern of replacing the
Federal Circuit’s pro-patent, bright-line tests with fuzzy, flexible
standards.82
76. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 20, 36, 44.
77. Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538, slip op. at 8.
78. Id. at 8–9. Section 271(f)(2) requires extra conditions to attach liability for supplying a
single component. Id.
79. Id. at 10–11. Justices Thomas and Alito did not join this part of the otherwise-unanimous
opinion, as in their view the history of the statute was unhelpful for answering the question
presented. Id. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 11.
81. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 4.
82. Although the Supreme Court’s holding firmly excludes liability for supply of one
component, it is unclear where precisely the line is between one component (no liability) and all
of them (clear liability). Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring). In contrast, the
Federal Circuit’s proposed case-by-case analysis, while inherently flexible and fact-specific, would
likely have resulted in a jury issue on substantiality whenever a defendant produced a necessary
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Of late, the Supreme Court has taken an interest in the Federal
Circuit’s pro-patent jurisprudence and has now reversed in nine of the
last eleven cases it has heard on appeal from that court.83 The Federal
Circuit, pursuing its purpose of creating a single body of uniform and
predictable patent case law, has often taken a highly formalistic
approach to the patent statutes.84 It has also interpreted these statutes
in favor of broad patent validity and strong patent rights.85 The
Supreme Court has rejected some of the Federal Circuit’s tests for
patentability in recent years (e.g., the machine-or-transformation test
in Bilski) without replacing them with anything nearly as predictable.86
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case contained some of these
same highly pro-patent and formalistic features. The opinion cited
dictionary definitions of “substantial” and “portion,” as well as
example evidence from the trial transcript to support the jury’s
reasonable conclusion conclusion that Life Technologies’ Taq
polymerase was an important part of the kits, and gave no
consideration to the purpose of the statute.87 The effect of opening up
manufacturers of staple commodities to patent liability for their
worldwide sales, as long as they knew their overseas buyers were
practicing U.S. patents, was apparently not considered.
Such an imposition of liability would contravene the purpose of
patent law, which exists “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,”88 by restricting the free flow of information and goods in
and out of the United States in a way that does not efficaciously
incentivize innovation. It is generally accepted that the free exchange
of goods, services, and information internationally promotes
innovation,89 so any restriction in the form of a patent monopoly must

component of a patented invention. See Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353–
54 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
83. See John Duffy, Argument preview: Is there a substantial chance the justices will affirm
the Federal Circuit’s reading of “substantial”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-is-there-a-substantial-chance-the-justices-will-affirmthe-federal-circuits-reading-of-substantial/.
84. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003).
85. Id. at 772.
86. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010); see Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court
and § 101 Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject-Matter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea
Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 631 (2014) (describing this pattern in the Bilski case).
87. Promega Corp., 773 F.3d at 1353–54.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
89. Stephen Ezell, The Relationship between Trade and Innovation, BRIDGES (May 15,
2013), http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/volume-37-may-15-2013/item/8106-the-relationship
-between-trade-and-innovation.
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be justified in terms of its providing an incentive to innovate that would
not otherwise have existed.90 The extra incentive is not present here.
The Federal Circuit’s reading of § 271(f)(1) would have imposed
excessive costs on manufacturers and international suppliers relative to
the benefits to patent holders. Under this reading, every export of a
commodity component used overseas in a patented invention could
give rise to a jury issue of patent infringement unless the manufacturer
has shut its eyes to whether any of its buyers are practicing U.S.
patents.91 Usually, the patent monopoly extends only to the practice of
the entire invention within the U.S.; this reflects a set of congressional
judgments about the proper reach of U.S. patent law and how much of
an incentive is necessary to prompt innovation.92 Reading § 271(f) as a
massive rather than minor expansion of patent rights changes this
carefully struck balance between incentives for initial innovation and
public access to innovative materials. And it does this without good
evidence that this was Congress’ intent.
Section 271(f) is already unusual within patent law in providing for
secondary infringement liability in the absence of an act of direct
infringement.93 To be sure, persons abroad must practice the patent for
liability to attach, but such practice does not qualify as infringement
when done outside the borders of the U.S.94 This provision makes sense
if the conduct prohibited is thought tantamount (or nearly so) to the
conduct prohibited by the conventional direct- and secondaryinfringement provisions in § 271(a)–(c). Congress’s purpose in enacting
§ 271(f) seems to have been to close the Deepsouth loophole without
opening any other loopholes further down the line, such that conduct
that avoids liability under § 271(f) genuinely bears little resemblance
to patent infringement. Exporting a commodity component, even with
knowledge of a patent and intent that the recipient make a patented
invention abroad, is not tantamount to making the whole invention, or
most of it, yourself.

90. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 345 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
copyright laws must incentivize the creation of new works to be constitutional).
91. See supra notes 51, 52, 64 and accompanying text.
92. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441, 455 (2007) (explaining the role
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in patent law).
93. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(“[L]iability for inducement must be predicated on direct infringement.”); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1),
(2) (2012) (addressing assembly “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States”).
94. Id. § 271(a).
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Allowing cases involving a single commodity export to go to juries
for a case-specific analysis of substantiality could decrease the
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing by increasing the risk of
infringement and thus the cost of manufacturing in the U.S. Many U.S.
patents employ preexisting commodities as components of the
inventions they claim. A U.S. manufacturer seeking to avoid a high
settlement-value guaranteed jury trial must remain ignorant of either
the business of their buyers or the patent landscape.95 Both are bad
business moves: the former because some patented inventions can be
licensed in a way that adds value to many companies, and the latter
because ignorance of business partners’ business exposes the
manufacturer to unforeseen risks. Congress would not have intended
to make simple commodity manufacturers eschew these best practices
just to avoid patent liability.
Avoiding these pitfalls, the Court adopted the district court’s
construction of the statute as excluding liability for supply of a single
component. This construction allows liability for conduct tantamount
to domestic patent infringement without leaving ordinary suppliers
unduly exposed. This holding makes good grammatical sense of the
statute and correctly interprets § 271(f)(1) in accordance with the
constitutionally mandated purpose of patent law.
CONCLUSION
Hard cases make bad law.96 Life Technologies was a particularly
egregious infringer vis-a-vis the kits it sold in the U.S.97 So it is
understandable that the Federal Circuit, when confronted with a
judgment as a matter of law for an actor who had clearly violated
Promega’s rights, would seek to quickly dispense with minor,
problematic issues, such as the scope of the phrase “substantial portion
of the components,” and let the initial jury verdict stand. But explicitly
allowing the sort of liability for foreign shipments that the Federal
Circuit allowed here would harm U.S. manufacturing. In this era of
relatively easy offshoring and friendly foreign manufacturing
destinations, this policy would drive commodity suppliers beyond the
reach of U.S. patent law rather than secure their license payments as
proper monopoly rents for our next generation of innovators. The
95. Even ignorance may not be sufficient if there is evidence that the supplier was willfully
blind. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
96. N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7.
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Supreme Court thus rightly limited this liability, excluding
manufacturers who supply just a single commodity component from
the statute’s scope.

